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NOTES AND OPINIONS
TRESPASS-NuISANCE-Low FLYING NEAR MUNICIPAL AIRPORT.-[Iowa]
Two interesting decrees were handed down by Judge Evans of the District
Court of Iowa, in and for Johnson County, on September 14, 1935, in the
cases of Tucker v. United Air Lines, Inc. and The City of Iowa City, and
The City of Iowa City and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Tucker,1 which decrees
are set out in full after this preliminary statement concerning the cases.
Duiing the fall of 1934, plaintiffs, City of Iowa City and United Air
Lines, Inc., filed a petition in equity in the Iowa District Court requesting
a temporary injunction against Tucker, the defendant, from interfering in
any manner with the rights of the plaintiffs in the use of said Iowa City
airport, and, particularly, "that the defendant be restrained from erecting
poles or other obstructions adjacent to said airport, and plaintiffs further
pray that on final hearing said injunction be made permanent and that at
said hearing the defendant be required to remove the trees planted along
the north line of said airport as set forth herein, and that the plaintiffs have
such other and further relief .... "
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff Tucker filed a petition in equity in the same
Iowa District Court requesting a temporary injunction restraining the de-
fendants, United Air Lines, Inc., and the City of Iowa City from operating,
or allowing to be operated, planes lower than fifty (50) feet over any por-
tion of Tucker's real estate. The petition also sought a hearing and a
permanent injunction. Tucker further asked for damages in the sum of
twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) and other relief.
The evidence presented tends to show that the city of Iowa City operates
a municipal airport about a mile and a half south of Iowa City, on the west
bank of the Iowa River and along U. S. Highway 161.2 Tucker's farm,
consisting of some 47 acres, adjoins the airport on the north boundary;
plaintiff's house being some 700 feet north of the airport and nearly 1200
feet in a northeasterly direction from the end of the NW/SE runway.
The Iowa City municipal airport was used as a scheduled stop by the
United Air Lines, Inc., and Tucker alleged low flying over his property by
planes and offered in evidence certain tree branches that he claimed had been
broken off by overflying aircraft.
Tucker, during the fall of 1934, for one reason or another planted
certain fast-growing poplar trees on his property-along the north boundary
of the airport in the vicinity of the north end of the NW/SE runway, and
1. Not yet officially reported. Copies of the two decrees furnished through
the courtesy of Mayer, Meyer. Austrian & Platt, of Chicago.
2. The field, as described In the Bureau of Air Commerce Airway Bulletin,
is "Rectangular, 3,100 by 2,640 feet, sod, level, artificial drainage; two hard-
surfaced runways, 2,500 by 150 feet NE/SW, and NW/SE .... .. " Descriptions
of Airports and Landing Fields in the United States, p. 65, (U. S. Department
of Commerce Airway Bulletin No. 2-1934).
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was threatening to plant similar trees along a large portion of the boundary
.when these proceedings were instituted. These trees were represented to be
some 35 feet in height.
Following the hearing, in which the cases were consolidated, the two
decrees hereinafter set forth were handed down:
(1) DECREE No. 26713:1
BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the 7th day of May, 1935, same being a day
of the May, 1935, Term of this court, the above entitled cause came on for
trial to the court, Dutcher, Walker & Ries and Frank Quindry appearing as
attorneys for United Air Lines, Inc., and Samuel D. Whiting appearing as
attorney for the City of Iowa City, Iowa, and E. P. Korab appearing as
attorney for plaintiff.
Thereupon by stipulation filed of record both parties agree that this
cause shall be consolidated with cause No. 28714, City of Iowa City, Iowa
and United Air Lines, Inc., and shall be tried together, that the pleadings,
evidence, exhibits and rulings shall constitute the record applicable to each
of said causes, reference being hereby made to said stipulation and same as
if set out in full herein. Thereupon said cause is tried, argued and sub-
mitted to the court.
Now, on this 14th day of September, 1935, same being still a day of the
May, 1935, term of this court, the court being now fully advised in the
premises finds that certain relief should be granted in each of said causes
above referred to and, therefore, a separate decree is rendered and filed in
each case. The court further finds that the material allegations of Para-
graph One, Paragraph Two as to the ownership of real estate, Paragraph
Three and Paragraph Four of plaintiff's petition are true and that the
reasonable value of the premises owned by plaintiff is approximately
$30,000.00.
The court further finds that the defendant United Air Lines, Inc., a
corporation, have operated and permitted to be operated its aircraft at a
height over plaintiff's premises that was unnecessarily low and within such
short distances from the ground that the witnesses for said defendant them-
selves admitted is not necessary for a safe and proper landing of aircraft.
The court further finds that the defendant City of Iowa City, Iowa,
have permitted said operation of aircraft landing at its airport.
The court further finds that such unnecessary low flying of aircraft
has interfered with the comfortable enjoyment by plaintiff of his property;
that plaintiff and those lawfully living upon or using said property have
thereby suffered inconvenience and danger and that some of plaintiff's trees
on the south boundary of his property have been damaged.
The court further finds that such operation of aircraft by said defendant
United Air Lines, Inc., and by its pilots or agents, should be enjoined and
restrained.
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendant United
Air Lines, Inc., be and it is hereby enjoined and restrained from operating
or permitting its aircraft, or those used by it, to fly or travel over the south
boundary of the property of plaintiff at a height lower than thirty feet from
3. Frew A. Tucker. Plaintiff v. United Air Lines, Inc., a corporation and
the City of Iowa City. Iowa, a municipal corporation, Defendants.
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the ground, and, except for a distance of one hundred and sixty feet north
of said boundary, said defendant shall not operate, or permit to be operated,-
its aircraft, or those used by it, at a height lower than fifty feet from the
ground over any part of the property of plaintiff described in the record
in this cause.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendant City of
Iowa City, Iowa, be and it is hereby enjoined and restrained from permitting
the aircraft of defendant United Air Lines, Inc., and any and all aircraft
using the airport involved in this action, or which may hereafter use it, to
fly over the south boundary of plaintiff's property at a height lower than
thirty feet from the ground and, except for a distance of one hundred and
sixty feet north of said south boundary, said defendant shall not permit any
aircraft to be operatcd at a height lower than fifty feet from the ground over
any part of the Iroperty of plaintiff.
The said defendant City of Iowa City, Iowa, is further enjoined and
restrained from using or permitting its said airport to be used for the land-
ing of aircraft which now or may hereafter fly, or are being flown over
and across the premises of plaintiff, lower than the height last above set out.
It is further ordered that a writ of injunction shall issue in accordance
with the provisions of this decree.
All further relief prayed for is denied.
It appearing to the court that the institution of this cause as well as the
institution of cause No. 26714 was brought about primarily by the act of
defendant United Air Lines, Inc., in flying its ships lower than necessary
over the premises of the plaintiff, it is, therefore, ordered that the costs of
this action, together with the costs of cause No. 26714 are each taxed to the
defendant United Air Lines, Inc. Judgment accordingly.
All parties except.
(Signed) H. D. EVANS,
Judge.
(2) DECREE No. 26714:4
BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the 7th day of May, 1935, same being a day
of the May, 1935, Term of this Court, the above entitled cause came on for
trial to the court, Dutcher, Walker & Ries and Frank Quindry appearing as
attorneys for United Air Lines, Inc., and Samuel D. Whiting appearing
as attorney for the City of Iowa City, Iowa, and E; P. Korab appearing as
attorney for defendant.
Thereupon by stipulation filed of record both parties agree that this
cause shall be consolidated with cause No. 26713, Frew A. Tucker v. United
Air Lines, Inc., and City of Iowa City, Iowa, and shall be tried together,
that the pleadings, evidence, exhibits and rulings shall constitute the record
applicable to each of said causes, reference being hereby made to said stipu-
lation the same as if set out in full herein. Thereupon said cause is tried,
argued and submitted to the court.
Now, on this 14th day of September, 1935, same being still a day of the
May, 1935, Term of this court, the court being now fully advised in- the
premises finds that certain relief should be granted in each of said causes
4. City of Iowa City, Iowa, and United Afr Lines, Inc., Plaintiffs v. Frew
A. Tucker. Delendant.
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above referred to and, therefore, a separate decree is rendered and filed in
each case.
The court further finds that the material allegations of Paragraphs 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the petition in the above entitled cause are true.
The court further finds that trees or poles along the south line or
boundary of the premises of defendant that are now or hereafter by growth
would attain a height of over twenty-five feet from the ground would ob-
struct air traffic and constitute a hazard thereto. That such trees or poles
along such boundary, or such that may hireafter be planted or placed there,
would not constitute a proper use and enjoyment of the defendant's premises
and would not be necessary for its enjoyment.
The court further finds that the planting, erection or maintenance of
trees, poles or other obstructions along or adjacent to the south line or
boundary of defendant's premises should therefore be enjoined and restrained.
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendant, Frew
A. Tucker, be and he is hereby enjoined and restrained from maintaining,
planting or erecting trees, poles or other obstructions on, along and adjacent
to the south boundary of his said premises that are or will by growth or
otherwise become in excess of twenty-five feet in height from the ground.
That said defendant be and he is further hereby enjoined and restrained
from erecting, planting or maintaining elsewhere upon his said premises
anything that would obstruct the safe operation of aircraft at a height of
fifty feet or more, except such as would be reasonably proper for the use
and enjoyment of his property. A description of the premises of defendant
appears in the record in this cause and reference is had thereto the same
as if set out in full in this decree.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendant, Frew A.
Tucker, shall, within fifteen days from the date hereof, remove any trees
or other obstructions from on, along or adjacent to the south boundary of
his said premises that now exist more than twenty-five feet in height from
the ground.
It is further ordered that a writ of injunction shall issue in accordance
with the provisions of this decree.
All other relief prayed for is denied.
The costs of this action shall be transferred to and taxed as a part
of the costs in cause No. 26713.
Exception.
(Signed) H. D. EVANS,
Judge.
DIGESTS
CONTRACTS-SUIT FOR ROYALTIES ON AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT.-[Federal] Plaintiff brings suit for the recovery of royalties allegedly due
under a series of contracts for the construction of airplanes which pro-
vided, among other things, that if the defendant should subsequently build,
or have built, planes of the same design, plaintiff would be entitled to royal-
tieg not to exceed $20,000.00. One contract succeeding the one containing
the royalties provision granted to the defendant the right to use any im-
provements and inventions that might be evolved in the process of construc-
tion. Numerous such changes were made by the plaintiff and also by the
subsequent manufacturer who produced airplanes of the same design under
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contract with the defendant. For construction of planes by the subsequent
manufacturer, plaintiff seeks to recover from the United States its maximum
provided royalties. The planes according to the original plans were similar
to the previously constructed French Spads and after proving unsafe and
dangerous were discarded. No patents upon any feature or part of the
plane in question were ever granted.
Field: Petition dismissed. The court failed to write an opinion giving
its conclusions of law concerning the case, but the special findings of fact
indicate that since there were no patent rights involved, and since the proc-
ess of construction had involved so many changes in the specifications, the
court felt justified in finding that the planes as finally completed were so
unlike those originally covered by the contract involving the royalties pro-
vision as not to be covered thereby. Thomas-Morse Aircraft Corporation
v. United States, - Fed. Supp. - (235 C. C. H. 3535-2, U. S. Court of
Claims, decided June 3, 1935, unreported to date). H. DON REYNOLDS.
INSURANCE-CNSTRUCTION OF "PARTICIPATION IN AVIATION" CLAUSE.-
[Fedral] The deceased, William N. Gregory, was insured by the defend-
ant. The policies contain provision that the insurance company should not
be liable for double indemnity for death resulting from "participation in
aeronautics." The insured was killed in an airplane crash, in the state of
Illinois while on a business trip, on April 18, 1933, riding as a passenger in
a plane piloted by his son. The plane had been purchased by the deceased,
but was registered in his son's name who had his transport pilot license. The
evidence showed that the deceased could not pilot the plane and had no
knowledge whatever of flying and had only been a passenger several times.
The plaintiff brought this action in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas and the defendants obtain judgment. Held: on
appeal, reversed. The court concluded that the words "participation in aero-
nautics," as used in .the policy did not when properly construed, include a
passenger on a transport plane who could not fly the plane or had any gen-
eral knowledge of aviation. Therefore, since the clause was ambiguous it
must be construed against the insurer. Gregory et at v. Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company of New York, 78 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 8th, August 19, 1935).
This decision breaks away from a line of precedent holding that if the
term "participating in aeronautics" is used, a passenger killed by an airplane
accident cannot recover, since he is "participating in aviation" in the
ordinary sense of the term. However, another line of cases has decided
that if the term "engaged in aeronautics" or other similar terms are used a
passenger can recover, since "engaged" denotes permanent affiliation and em-
ployment in the industry. These two lines of precedent were reviewed and
discussed in the case of Goldsmith v. New Yark Life Insurance Company
(69 Fed. (2d) 273 C. C. A. 8th). In that case the clause was "from engag-
ing, as a passenger or otherwise, in submarine or aeronautic operations," and
the court held that "as a passenger or otherwise" made it all inclusive in-
chiding those permanently affiliated with aviation as well as passengers. All
of these cases were reviewed and commented on in 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
278 (1935).
In the case tinder consideration the court said the clause is ambiguous
and that if the word "participation" had been modified by a clause such as
"passengers or otherwise," it would have clearly shown the intention of the
parties. The construction that the court gives the word "participation" in
this case is uniqiue and shows, as they pointed out, a construction in the light
of modern conditions and developments in aviation, quite different from the
construction given the term when the industry was in its infancy. On this
point the court classifies the person who rides as a passenger as one "who
makes no research, no investigation, no experiment, and he has no control
of the machine .... ." Thus they conclude that only those who do enter into
these operations are participating in aviation. The court says the passenger
"does not belong to the same craft or class as those skilled artisans who
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participate in the construction, management, or operation of the airplane."
It is interesting to note that the court in deciding this case referred to the
Encyclopedia Britannica for a definition of aeronautics. In the opinion the
court cites the names of the chapter headings that appeared in that article
and since none of these referred to the passengers' contribution to flying, he
concluded that a passenger does not participate in aeronautics.
Thus this case varies from the precedent, because of a different inter-
pretation of the term "participate." As was suggested in 6 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 278 (1935), the safest clause the insurance companies can use to
avoid liability for death of passengers, is "engaged in aeronautics as a passen-
ger or otherwise," or, as this case suggests, "participating as a passenger or
otherwise"-thus making the modifying words "passenger or otherwise" all
important, and obviating the defense of ambiguity.
WILLIAM G. KARNES.
NEGLIGENCE-AIRLINE PLANE CRASH-RES IPSA LoQuITUR.- [Federal]
This case concerns the claim of Mrs. Arthur R. Thomas for damages for the
death of her husband, who on March 19, 1932, was riding as a fare-paying
passenger in an airplane operated by the defendant American Airways, Inc.,
on a trip from Douglas, Arizona, to the City of Los Angeles. The plane
took off at Phoenix, Arizona, bound for the Burbank airport but crashed at
7:38 P. M. at the western end of the San Gorgonio Pass, near the small town
of Yucaipa, California. Thomas received injuries in the crash which caused
his death. The Industrial Commission of Arizona, which paid certain benefit
allowances to the plaintiff as the widow of the deceased passenger, asserted
an interest in the claim made by the plaintiff and for that reason was before
the court as an intervener and party complainant-particularly as Thomas
was on business for his Arizona employer at the time of his injury. The sole
right of recovery rested upon the asserted ground that the defendant Amer-
ican Airways, through its pilot and agencies, was negligent in the handling of
the plane in which the deceased was riding and that the death of plaintiff's
husband was proximately caused by such negligence. The defendant denied
its status as a common carrier, and denied that it or the pilot was guilty of
negligence. Held: for the defendant, as a result of a verdict by the jury in
his favor. The judge instructed the jury that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
relied on by plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, was applicable but also
explained its limitations. Thomas v. American Airways, Inc., 235 C. C. H.
1205 (unreported-U. S. Dist. Ct. for So. Dist. of Calif., Central Division,
Cases Nos. 5922-C and 6396-J, decided January 23, 1935).
LORRAINE ARNOLD.
NEGLIGENCE-AIRPLANE CRASH-REcOVERY NOT PERMITTED GUEsT-REA-
SONABLE EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT.-[Pennsylvania] The plaintiff, a guest, was
injured when defendant, the pilot-owner of the airplane, lost control at a
height of 250 feet while in the process of "dragging a field" preparatory to
making a landing. The field was forty acres in area, and was not used for
landing purposes. The defendant cut his switch before the impact. The
plaintiff predicated his recovery upon two alleged tortious acts of the de-
fendant: (a) landing at an improper field, contrary to the regulations of the
Department of Commerce; (b) cutting the switch as the ship commenced to
fall, rather than making an attempt to regain flying speed. Held: judgment
n. o. v. for defendant affirmed. The opinion of an expert, called by plaintiff,
as to the impropriety of selecting the field was based on facts not in the
record, and inconsistent with the actual situation. The field was freshly
rolled and presented a hard, smooth surface. The surface owner signalled
his assent to the landing. The action of the defendant in cutting the switch
was not an unreasonable exercise of judgment. Murphy v. Neely, - Pa. -,
179 Atl. 439 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, June 29, 1935).
The plaintiff might have had a better chance for recovery had he based
his action, not on the selection of the field, nor on the action of the defendant
in cutting the switch, but on the fact that the plane apparently stalled with
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no extraneous conditions responsible; that from this an inference could
properly be drawn of improper management of the airplane, with a cor-
responding shift of the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant.
In short, it is suggested that a resort to. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by
the plaintiff's attorney might well have produced a different result. Sed
quaere whether the courts would or should impose such a high measure of
care on a private carrier not for hire?
B. W. HEINEMAN.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT.-[New York] Ap-
peal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the
Third Judicial Department (242 App. Div. 712, 272 N. Y. S. 868), entered
July 31, 1934, reversing an award of the State Industrial Board made under
the Workmen's Compensation Law and dismissing the claim. The husband
of the claimant was employed as a bench hand in the manufacturing plant of
the respondent Consolidated Aircraft Corporation. On the morning of
December 15, 1931, while about to enter the premises to engage in work for
the day, he slipped and fell, sustaining the injuries on the basis of which the
award herein was made. He subsequently died, and the award was then
ordered paid to the claimant. The Appellate Division, in dismissing the claim
on the ground that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the
employment, held that it happened in the street, not within the confines of
respondent's premises, and that the risk of travel was not a risk of the em-
ployment. Held: order affirmed. Norah L. White v. Consolidated Aircraft
Corporation et al., 266 N. Y. 554, 195 N. E. 197 (1935). (Court of Appeals
of New York, decided Feb. 26, 1935).
LORRAINE ARNOLD.
